In an incomplete semimartingale model of a financial market, we consider several risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of a bundle of contingent claims. Assuming that the agents' risk preferences are modelled by convex capital requirements, we define and analyze their demand functions and propose a notion of a partial equilibrium price.
Introduction
In complete market models, the price of a contingent claim is simply given by its replication cost. In the more realistic, incomplete models, the arbitrage-free paradigm typically fails to produce a unique price and yields only a price-interval. The presence of unhedgeable claims -due to the aforementioned market incompleteness -necessitates the introduction of another fundamental principle whenever one wants to produce a unique value for a given contingent claim. The long history of empirical inquiry into human behavior under risk dictates that this additional component is related to some numerical measure of riskaversion, idiosyncratic to the agent valuing the claim. The majority of the existing literature uses agents' risk The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we describe the market model, introduce necessary notation and state some properties of the agents' acceptance sets and capital requirements. In section 3, we define and discuss the notion of mutually agreeable claim-allocations and analyze its relation to the Pareto optimality. Partial-equilibrium price-allocation is introduced in section 4, where an existence and uniqueness result is provided and discussed. Finally, in section 5 we exhibit conditions on specification of the agents' acceptance sets that yield stability of the equilibrium price. plays the role of a numéraire security or a discount factor. Operationally, we simply set S (0) t ≡ 1, for all t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s. We also impose the assumption of no free lunch with vanishing risk (see [20] ). Namely, we define M a = {Q ≪ P : S is a local martingale under Q} and M e = {Q ≈ P : S is a local martingale under Q} and make the following standing assumption.
We allow the possibility that the liquid part of the financial market is incomplete, i.e., that M e is not a singleton.
Admissible Strategies.
For σ-algebra G ⊆ F, L 0 (G) denotes the set of all P−a.s. equivalence classes of G-measurable random variables, and L ∞ (G) the set of all (classes of) essentially bounded elements of L 0 (G). When the underlying σ-algebra G is omitted, it should be assumed that G = F . Shortcuts B + C = {X + Y : X ∈ B, Y ∈ C}, −B = {−X : X ∈ B}, B + = {X ∈ B : X ≥ 0, a.s.}, B − = {X ∈ B : X ≤ 0, a.s.} for B, C ⊆ L 0 = L 0 (F ), will be used throughout.
A financial agent (with initial wealth x) invests in the market by choosing a portfolio strategy ϑ ∈ L(S),
where L(S) denotes the set of predictable stochastic processes integrable with respect to S. The resulting wealth process, (X x,ϑ t ) t∈ [0,T ] , is simply the stochastic integral:
We say that a strategy ϑ admissible if the induced wealth process is uniformly bounded from below by a constant and we denote the set of admissible strategies by Θ, i.e., (2.2) Θ = {ϑ ∈ L(S) : ∃c ∈ R such that c ≤ (ϑ · S) t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.}
The collection of all wealth processes corresponding to the initial wealth x and admissible portfolio strategies is denoted by X (x), i.e.,
Furthermore, we define the sets X = x∈R X (x), X ∞ = X ∩ L ∞ and R = {X ∈ X : −X ∈ X }.
Remark 2.2.
(1) Local boundedness of the price process S implies that X ∈ R if and only if there exists x ∈ R and ϑ ∈ Θ such that X = x + (ϑ · S) T and (ϑ · S) t is uniformly bounded. In particular, R ⊆ L ∞ .
(2) The lower bound on the losses of the admissible strategies is imposed to avoid pathologies that the so-called doubling strategies create. Moreover, Assumption 2.1 excludes the existence of arbitrage opportunities in the liquid market (see [20] , Corollary 1.2). Note also that X ∈ X ∞ does not imply that −X ∈ X , since there exist admissible strategies such that (ϑ · S) T ∈ L ∞ but (−ϑ · S) t is not uniformly bounded from below.
2.3. The Acceptance Sets. Given the financial market (S (0) ; S) and the set of admissible strategies Θ, we suppose that each agent's risk preferences, investment goals, possible stochastic income, etc., are incorporated in a setÃ ⊆ L 0 (F ) called the acceptance set. We interpretÃ as the set that contains the discounted net wealths of investment positions with maturity T that the agent deems acceptable at time t = 0.
In concordance with the standard postulates of the risk-measure theory, we assume thatÃ satisfies the following axioms:
Remark 2.3. Axiom Ax1 simply states that every investment with payoff a.s. above the payoff of an acceptable claim is also acceptable. Axiom Ax2 reflects the fact that diversified portfolios of acceptable investments should also be acceptable, while Axiom Ax3 means that the "status quo" (i.e., no investment at all) is an acceptable position and that the non-trivial investments which never make money are not acceptable.
Finally, axiom Ax4 is the one that provides a link between the liquid market and the agent's acceptable positions. One should think ofÃ as an "already-optimized" representation of agent's preferences, in the sense that the fact that the liquid market stands at the agent's disposal has already been taken into account.
One of the direct consequences of Ax4, and a more mathematical reformulation of the last sentence, is the following property:
If there exists X ∈ X (0) such that B + X ∈Ã, then B ∈Ã.
More directly, if a position can be improved to acceptability by costless trading, it should already be considered acceptable. The reader should note that the situation is not entirely symmetric: it can happen that B − X is acceptable for some X ∈ X (0), but B is not. The reason is that X may not be bounded from above so that there is no admissible strategy (with −X ∈ X (0) being the prime candidate) which will bring B into acceptability.
An important, but by no means only, example of an acceptable set which satisfies Ax1-Ax4 can be constructed using utility functions:
Example 2.4. A classical example of an acceptance set that satisfies the axioms Ax1 -Ax4 is the one induced by a utility function, i.e., a mapping U : (a, ∞) → R, a ∈ [−∞, 0], which is strictly concave, strictly increasing, continuously differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions
We also include a random endowment (illiquid investments, stochastic income) whose value at time T given by E ∈ L ∞ (F T ). The agent's investment goal is to maximize the expected utility by trading the market assets and for every contingent claim B ∈ L 0 + − L ∞ + , the resulting indirect utility is defined by
where x > 0 is the agent's initial wealth. For sufficient assumptions that lead to the existence of the optimal trading strategy, we refer the interested reader to [17] , [32] for the case a > −∞ and [7] and [40] for a = −∞.
The set of acceptable claims is then given by
It is straightforward to check thatÃ U (x) indeed satisfies the axioms Ax1 -Ax4, for x > 0. Axioms Ax1 and Ax2 imply that ρ A (0) = 0 and the inequality − B ∞ ≤ B ≤ B ∞ together with axiom
holds trivially. If, in addition, the set A satisfies the following mild closedness property
the inverse inclusion also holds (see Proposition 4.7 in [27] ). Property (2.7) holds, in particular, ifÃ ∩ V is closed (with respect to any linear topology) for any finite-dimensional subspace V ⊆ L ∞ . In what follows, with a slight abuse of terminology, when we mention the term acceptance set we will refer to the set
Remark 2.5. Similar definitions of the convex capital requirement have been given in [27] (page 207) and [28] . In the former, a given acceptance set A is related to the market through a larger acceptance setÂ, defined by
In our case, (2.3) implies thatÂ = A, which is yet another reformulation of the "already-optimized" property of Remark 2.3. In [28] , the authors define the generalized capital requirement bŷ
If the acceptance setÃ satisfies the axioms Ax1 -Ax4, it is straightforward to show that ρ A (B) =ρ A (B). The existence of an admissible strategy in the definitions ofρ A (·) andÂ has been established in [46] , Theorem 2.6.
2.5. A Robust Representation. It is shown in [25] that under the assumption that A is weak- * closed (closed in the weak topology σ(L ∞ , L 1 )), the convex risk measure ρ A (·) admits a robust representation in the sense of [3] and [18] . The additionally imposed axiom Ax4 provides some further information about the penalty function and, in particular, about its effective domain, denoted by M A . The following proposition is similar, but not identical, to the results in [27] and [36] .
Proposition 2.6. If A is a weak- * closed acceptance set, then
(1) ρ A admits a robust representation of the following form Proof. Thanks to the results in [27] and [36] , it is enough to show that for every Q / ∈ M a , α A (Q) = +∞.
For every such Q, there exists an admissible terminal wealth X ∈ X (x), such that E Q [X] > x, i.e., there exists a portfolio ϑ ∈ Θ, such that (ϑ · S) t is uniformly bounded from below and 
2.6. Risk-equivalence. The following definition (see also [2] ) will be used extensively in the sequel:
Definition 2.8. Two random variables B, C ∈ L ∞ are said to be risk-equivalent (or equivalent with respect
It is straightforward to check that the relation ∼ is indeed an equivalence relation in L ∞ . The condition B ∼ C means that the claims with payoffs B and C carry the same unhedgeable risk. Moreover, it is easy to see that the condition B ∼ C implies that
On the other hand, if B ≁ C, convex combinations of the payoffs B and C may lead to reduction of risk.
If any such combination of claims (which do not belong in the same equivalence class) reduces the risk, the corresponding acceptance set A is called risk-strictly convex : Definition 2.9. An acceptance set A is called risk-strictly convex if for all B, C ∈ A with B ≁ C and every λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a random variable E ∈ L ∞ + and Q ∈ ∂ρ A (λB + (1 − λ)C) such that, Q(E > 0) > 0 and Proof. We first assume that A is risk-strictly convex and show the contrapositive of the stated implication.
This implies that ρ A (λB
, and so, by monotonicity of ρ A , we have
Conversely, suppose that (2.10) implies B ∼ C, for all B, C ∈ L ∞ . Then for any pair B ≁ C and every λ ∈ (0, 1) we must have that
so it is enough to take E = −ρ A (λB + (1 − λ)C) in the definition of risk-strict convexity.
Remark 2.11. An examination of the above proof reveals that the seemingly stronger condition where the random variable E is replaced by a positive constant leads to the same concept as in Definition 2.9.
Under the assumption that the acceptance set A is risk-strictly convex, we can say a bit more about the effective domain of the penalty function of the induced risk measure, M A .
Proposition 2.12. If the acceptance set A is weak- * closed and risk-strictly convex, then
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists
for all n ∈ N, and all C ∈ L ∞ . By convexity, 12, that the minimizers of the penalty function α A (·) are equivalent to P when A is risk-strictly convex, implies that a risk-strictly convex risk measures are sensitive. Indeed, by (2.9),
Another direct property of risk-strictly convex acceptance set is the following:
Proposition 2.14. Let ρ A be the risk measure corresponding to a weak- * closed, risk-strictly convex acceptance set A. Then,
In particular,
Hence, 3. Mutually-Agreeable Bundles 3.1. The Agents. We consider I ≥ 2 financial agents and suppose that each agent i has access to a submarket S i of S, i.e., she is allowed to invest only in (S (0)
Note that the numéraire S (0) ≡ 1 is accessible to each agent. In order to take the whole market into account and avoid trivialities, we also assume that each component of S is accessible to at least one agent. Note that the Assumption 2.1 implies that M i a = ∅, for all i, where
We define the sets X i , X i (x), Θ i and R i exactly as in section 2, with S i used in lieu of S. Moreover, each agent is assumed to have an acceptance setÃ i which satisfies the axioms Ax1 -Ax4. The induced risk measure ρ Ai on L ∞ will be denoted by ρ i , and M i will be the shortcut for M Ai , i.e., it will stand for the effective domain of the corresponding penalty function α i , i = 1, 2, . . . , I. If we further assume that the intersectioñ
, is weak- * closed and hence the induced risk measure ρ i = ρ Ai admits the following robust representation
where M i ⊆ M i a for all i. As above, ∂ρ i (B) denotes the set of all maximizers in (3.1), for B ∈ L ∞ and i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Bundles, Allocations and Agreement. For bundle of claims
.., n. For convenience, the i-th row (a i,k ) n k=1 of a will be denoted by a i ; it counts the quantities of each of the n components of B held by the agent i. The set of all feasible allocations is denoted by F, i.e.,
We usually think of the elements of B as the claims (typically not replicable in the liquid market S) the agents are trading among themselves. These claims are in zero net supply, i.e., some of the agents will be taking positive and some negative positions in them. Clearly, the agents will be willing to share the bundle of claims B according to an allocation a ∈ F only if there exists a price vector p ∈ R n , for which the position a i · B − a i · p is acceptable for each agent i. More precisely, we give the following definition:
n × F of a bundle of claims and an allocation is called mutually
For an allocation a, let G a denote the set of all feasible allocations of B, acceptable for every agent: 
Proof. The convexity follows directly from the convexity of A i 's.
For the second statement, suppose first that B ∈ G a ∩ (−G a ), i.e., there exist p,p ∈ R n such that
≤ 0, which means (thanks to the risk-strict convexity of ρ i ) that a i · B ∈ R i for all i, i.e., B ∈R a .
Conversely, let B ∈R a so that a i · B ∈ R i , for all i. We pick an arbitrary Q ∈ M a and define
a . It remains to observe thatR −a =R a and that
For a bundle B ∈ (L ∞ ) n , the set G B is, in a sense, polar to G a : 
The following assumption is equivalent to (ρ 1 ♦ . . . ♦ρ I )(0) > −∞ (see [5] 
The following Proposition is a mild generalization of Theorem 3.6 in [5] , where the case of I = 2 is addressed. The proof when I ≥ 2 is similar and hence omitted. In words, Pareto optimality implies that there is no wealth-preserving transaction that will be acceptable for everyone and strictly acceptable for at least one agent. The problem of Pareto-optimality is closely related to the problem of optimal risk sharing (sometimes called Pareto optimal allocation), which was recently addressed by many authors in the cases where agents use convex risk measures to value claim payoffs (see [5] , [6] , [13] , [24] , [31] , [34] ). Below, we state a well-known characterization of the Pareto optimality in terms of the minimizers of the penalty functions α i . We remind the reader that ∂ρ i (B) stands for the set of maximizers in the robust representation (3.1) of ρ i (B) and omit the standard proof: 
The following proposition states that if the agents are in Pareto-optimal configuration, the risk-strict convexity assumption implies that transactions involving non-replicable claims result in strictly increased risk for at least one of the agents involved in this transaction. Proof. Assume that there exists k ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} such that B k / ∈ R k . Then, by risk-strict convexity, for each Proof. B ∈ G a means that there exists a price vector p, such that a i · B − a i · p ∈ A i , for all i. This implies that I i=1 ρ i (a i · B) ≤ 0, which, by the hypotheses and Proposition 3.9 yields that a i · B ∈ R i for all i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Example 3.11. Suppose that all I agents are exponential-utility maximizers with possibly different riskaversion coefficients γ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , I, i.e., U i (x) = − exp(−γ i x) (for details on the set of admissible strategies, we refer the reader to [19] and [39] ). Let E i , i = 1, 2, . . . , I, denote the agents' random endowments. If we follow the arguments of Proposition 3.15 in [2] , we can conclude that in the case S i = S for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, the agents will be in the Pareto-optimal configuration if and only if γi γj E i ∼ E j , for all i, j = 1, 2, ..., I. A special case of this condition occurs when the agents' random endowments are replicable. However, this is not the case when agents have access to different markets. To see that, let us consider the case I = 2, with S 1 = S 2 and E 1 = E 2 = 0. It follows from Theorem 2.2 in [19] , that ∂ρ 1 (0) = ∂ρ 2 (0) (both are singletons in this case) if and only if γ 1 (ϑ
is the optimal trading strategy in the market S i of the agent i, i = 1, 2. p , where p = 0 is the relative risk aversion coefficient, is similar to the previous example. Without going into details, let us mention that it is known (see for instance [44] ) that if all agents have access to the same market, ∂ρ i (0) = ∂ρ j (0), for all i, j if and only if the agents' relative risk aversion coefficients are equal, regardless of their initial wealths.
However, when agents have access to different markets, it is easy to construct counterexamples.
The Partial Equilibrium Price Allocation
4.1. The Demand Correspondence. Having introduced the setup consisting of I agents, their acceptance sets and accessible assets, we turn to the partial-equilibrium pricing problem for a fixed bundle of claims
Our first task is to analyze single agent's demand for B under the natural assumption that in a set of payoffs, an agent will choose the one which minimizes the capital requirement. For linear combinations of the components of B, we have the following, more precise, definition:
Let A be a weak- * closed acceptance set. For a bundle B ∈ (L ∞ ) n , we say that A is strictly convex with respect to B if for every (a, m), (δ, k) ∈ A(B), where
such that a = δ the following statement holds:
for every λ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a random variable E ∈ L ∞ + and Q ∈ ∂ρ i (λa + (1 − λ)δ) · B), such that Q(E > 0) > 0 and Before we proceed to our next auxiliary result, we set
Lemma 4.4. Pick i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} and assume that that A i is weak- * closed and strictly convex with respect to B. Let {a k } k∈N be a sequence of the form a k = a 0 + γ k v ∈ R n , for some v ∈ R n \ {0}, a 0 ∈ R n , and a sequence {γ k } k∈N of positive constants with lim k γ k = ∞. If {Q k } k∈N is an arbitrary sequence of probability
Proof. Our first claim is that
For ε > 0 there exists Q ε ∈ M i such that
and, for that choice of Q ε , there exists K ∈ N such that for k ≥ K we have
Thanks to convexity of ρ i , the ratio ρi(−an·B)−ρi(−a0·B) γn is nondecreasing, so its limit as n → ∞ exists in
and (4.4) follows.
We continue by noting that since Q k ∈ ∂ρ i (−a k · B) and α i (·) ≥ 0, we have
and so
We conclude the proof by noting that since M B i ⊆ M i , all the inequalities above are, in fact, equalities.
n be a bundle of claims for which there is no a ∈ R n such that a · B ∈ R i . If A i is weak- * closed and strictly convex with respect to B, then the expectation
is the same for all Q ∈ ∂ρ i (a · B), the function r i : R n → R, defined by
is continuously differentiable and
Proof. Thanks to convexity of r i and Proposition I.5.3 in [22] , it will be enough to show that E Q [−B] is the unique subgradient of r i at a for any Q ∈ ∂ρ i (a · B). To proceed, we suppose that a * ∈ R n satisfies
for all δ ∈ R n , and that a
. Consider, first, the case when −a * ∈ P i (B), i.e., when there existŝ δ ∈ R n such thatδ = a and a * = EQ[−B] for someQ ∈ ∂ρ i (δ). If we substitueδ for δ in (4.6) we get
Note, however, that
and the equality holds if and only ifQ ∈ ∂ρ i (a · B). This implies that
which contradicts the assumption of strict convexity with respect to B.
It is left to show that if a * = (a * 1 , . . . , a * n ) ∈ R n satisfies (4.6), then −a * ∈ P i (B). We argue by contradiction and assume that this is not the case. By Lemma 4.4 this means that there exists a component l ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that either a *
We can assume without loss of generality that the former holds and that l = 1. The inequality (4.6), in which a 1 = (a 1 + 1, a 2 , a 3 , ..., a n )
is substituted for δ, implies that
On the other hand, for Q 1 ∈ ∂ρ i (a 1 · B), we have
n there is no a ∈ R n such that a · B ∈ R i and if A i is strictly convex with respect to B, the demand correspondence is Z i (p) is non-empty only when p ∈ P i (B). Indeed, thanks to its definition as a minimizer of a differentiable convex function, the set Z i (p), consists of the solutions a, of the equation
where r i is defined in (4.5) above. Lemma 4.5 states, however, that ∇r i (a) ∈ P i (B). Moreover, when p ∈ P i (B), Z i (p) is a singleton; this follows directly from strict convexity of r i . Finally, it follows easily from (4.7) that Z i is an injection on P i (B). Proposition 4.7. Let i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} and B ∈ (L ∞ ) n be a bundle for which there is no a ∈ R n such that a · B ∈ R i . If A i is weak- * closed and strictly convex with respect to B, then the demand function Z i is continuous in P i (B) and satisfies the monotonicity property
Proof. The continuity is a direct application of the Berge's Maximum Theorem (see, for instance, Theorem 17.31 in [1] ). To establish monotonicity, we recall that the properties of Z i exposed in Remark 4.6 above imply that
The required monotonicity follows when we add the above inequalities.
4.2. Equilibrium. Our goal in this subsection is to prove existence and uniqueness of a partial-equilibrium price for a given bundle B ∈ (L ∞ ) n . We follows the classical paradigm: the price vector p is a partialequilibrium price of B, if, when B trades at p, demand and supply for each of its components offset each other, i.e., the market for B clears. It should be noted that we do not require that the agents' positions in the liquid markets clear as well. A mathematically precise formulation of the above principle, where we also consider the equilibrium allocation, is given in the folowing definition:
Definition 4.8. We say that the pair (p, a) ∈
The following two assumptions will be in effect throughout the section:
Assumption 4.9. The acceptance set A i is weak- * closed and strictly convex with respect to B, for all i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Remark 4.11. Assumption 4.10 implies, in particular, that for every i = 1, 2, ..., I, there is no δ ∈ R n \ {0}
Remark 4.12. If Assumptions 4.9 and 4.10 hold true and the agents are in a Pareto optimal configuration then the pair (p, a) ∈ I i=1 P i (B) × F is a PEPA if and only if a = 0. To see this, assume that there exists an a ∈ F\{0} such that (p, a) is a PEPA. Then, by the definition of Z i , we have ρ i (a i · B) + a i · p ≤ 0 for all i, and, due to the strict convexity of the risk measures, the inequality is strict for at least two agents. 
This implies that
Proof. We first define the strictly convex function f :
. We are left with the task of showing that ∇f (a) has a root, and assume, per contra, that this is not the case. Then, by the continuity of f , we deduce that for, each m ∈ N, there exists a (m) ∈ D m = {a ∈
Furthermore, by the strict convexity of f , it follows that ||a (m) || 1 = m. Hence, thanks to the results of, e.g., Chapter 1 in [9] , a contradiction would be reached if the following coercivity condition held:
By passing to a subsequence (if necessary), we can assume without loss of generality that the limits
Consequently, (4.10) follows from
where the strictness of the last inequality follows from Assumption 4.10. 
The well-posedness of the equilibrium pricing
The exact shape of agents' acceptance sets, which incorporate their risk preferences, endowments and investment goals, is extremely difficult to estimate in practice. It is therefore natural to ask whether the induced equilibrium pricing is stable with respect small perturbation in the agents' acceptance sets. To be more precise, we want to check whether the equilibrium pricing scheme, presented in section 4, is a well-posed problem in the sense of Hadamard (see [30] ), i.e., if its solution exists, is unique and stable with respect to the input data (the agents' acceptance sets in this case). Having solved the problem of existence and uniqueness (see Theorem 4.13), we turn our attention to the following question: can we specify a convergence (concept) ⊛ −→ for I-tuples of the weak- * closed acceptance sets A
, for which
where (p 
We say that a sequence {f m } m∈N of lower semi-continuous functions f m : R l → R converges to a function f in the Kuratowski sense (and we write f m
We remind the reader that the epigraph of a function f : (a) For every x ∈ R k and every sequence x n such that x n → x, lim inf f n (x n ) ≥ f (x) and (b) For every x ∈ R k there exists a sequence x n such that x n → x and lim sup f n (x n ) ≤ f (x).
The Kuratowski convergence and its versions for more general topological spaces have been extensively used in the study of the well-posedness of a variety of variational problems (see [43] for problems in R n and [21] and [38] for general spaces).
In what follows, for each agent i, we consider a sequence of weak- * closed acceptance sets A Proof. By (2.6), for a bundle B ∈ (L ∞ ) n , the set A(B) is the epigraph of the function
is equivalent to the Kuratowski convergence of the sequence of functions
It is shown in [43] , Theorem 7.17, that for any sequence (f m ) m∈N of convex functions on
implies that f m → f point-wise in R n , provided that f is a convex, lower semi-continuous function and its effective domain has non-empty interior. It is, therefore, enough to observe that the function a ∋ R n → ρ i (a · B) is convex and lower semi-continuous in
semi-continuous risk measure.
As the reader can easily check, Kuratowski convergence will not, in general, preserve strict convexity. In order to guarantee that the limiting acceptance set A i is strictly convex with respect to the fixed bundle of claims B, we must assume that the strict convexity of A Example 5.8. We consider the utility-based acceptance sets discussed in Example 2.4 for the agent i (see [32] for technical details) and we consider a sequence of utility functions U for every sequence a (m) ∈ R n that converges to some a ∈ R n . It is, then, straightforward to get that 
